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Abstract
We explore the various arguments for and against the recommendation that
younger households should invest a larger share of their pension wealth in
risky assets. The ability of young agents to compensate their financial losses
by saving more during their career provides the strongest argument in favor
of younger people investing more aggressively in the stock market. Mean-
reversion in stock returns yields another argument. However, the uninsurabil-
ity of the risky human capital goes into the opposite direction, together with
the imperfect knowledge that young investors have about the distribution of
asset returns.
Keywords: dynamic portfolio choice, pension plan, retirement, time
horizon.
1 Introduction
A large fraction of European citizens living in countries with a traditionally
strong pay-as-you-go system now perceives that their social security ben-
efits will not be sufficient to maintain their life-style after retirement. As
a consequence, there is a growing demand for individual long-term savings
plans that would be specifically designed for financing consumption after re-
tirement. This phenomenon raises an interesting new decision problem for
european consumers who used to save mostly for the short run. With these
emerging markets, the typical time horizon for the planned consumers’ in-
vestment can now be as large as 40 years. For such time horizons, the impact
of the investment strategy on final wealth is enormous. Selecting this strat-
egy is thus an important challenge for these consumers and their financial
advisors.
During the XXth century in the U.S., the real return on bonds has been
1% per year, whereas investing in stocks generated an expected return of
7%. Thus, a young worker investing 100 at the age of 25 would obtain a
pension wealth at the age of 65 equaling 149 if she has been 100% invested
in bonds. This pension wealth would equal 1497 on average if she would
have invested everything in stocks. The equity premium puzzle is magnified
by the exponential nature of compounded interests of long-term investors.
Thus, the temptation is large for young households to take advantage of
the large equity premium by investing a large fraction of their pension plan
wealth on the stocks market. This is in fact one of the arguments usually
presented to advocate a move from a dominant PAYG system towards a more
funded system. The problem, however, is that not only the expected benefit
of this strategy, but also the associated risk on the final pension wealth, are
proportional to the time horizon of the investor. Investing in stocks for one
year entails some risk, but investing in stocks for 40 years is 40 times riskier (if
risk is measured by the variance of final wealth, assuming no serial correlation
of stock returns)! Thus, it is not clear a priori that younger investors should
take more risk.
The problem implicit in dynamic portfolio choices is to determine how fu-
ture investment opportunities affect instantaneous investment choices. Pop-
ular treatments suggest that short time horizons often lead to excessively
conservative strategies. Samuelson (1989) and several others have asked:
“As you grow older and your investment horizon shortens, should you cut
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down your exposure to lucrative but risky equities?” Conventional wisdom
answers affirmatively, stating that long-horizon investors can tolerate more
risk because they have more time to recoup transient losses. This dictum
has not received the backing of scientific theory, however. As Samuelson
(1963, 1989) in particular points out, this “time-diversification” argument
relies on a fallacious interpretation of the Law of Large Numbers: repeating
an investment pattern over many periods does not cause risk to wash out in
the long run. This fallacy is illustrated by the following question raised by
Samuelson (1963): ”I offered some lunch colleagues to bet each $200 to $100
that the side of a coin they specified would not appear at the first toss. One
distinguished scholar (...) gave the following answer: I won’t bet because I
would feel the $100 loss more than the $200 gain. But I’ll take you on if you
promise to let me make 100 such bets”. This story suggests that independent
risks are complementary. However, Samuelson went ahead and asked why it
would be optimal to accept 100 separately undesirable bets. The scholar
answered: ”One toss is not enough to make it reasonably sure that the law
of averages will turn out in my favor. But in a hundred tosses of a coin, the
law of large numbers will make it a darn good bet.”
Obviously, this scholar misinterprets the Law of Large Numbers! It is
not by accepting a second independent lottery that one reduces the risk
associated with the first one. If ex1, ex2, ..., exn are independent and identically
distributed random wealth variables, ex1+ ex2+ ...+ exn has a variance n times
as large as the variance of each of these risks. What is stated by the Law
of Large Numbers is that 1n
Pn
i=1 exi – not Pni=1 exi – tends to Eex1 almost
surely as n tends to infinity. It is by subdividing – not adding – risks that
they are washed away by diversification.
Table 1 provides some information about how U.S. consumers link their
optimal pension portfolio to their age. It describes actual portfolio composi-
tions of individual TIAA-CREF plans, as observed in June 2000. A simple
pattern appears in this table: consumers tend to follow the recommenda-
tion to rebalance their portfolio in favor of safer assets when growing older.
Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) however show that when taking care of the time
effect, there is no clear evidence supporting a gradual reduction in portfolio
shares with age among TIAA-CREF participants.
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Allocation Pattern\Age Under 35 35-44 45-54 Above 55
100% Equity 34.9 32.6 30.1 28.1
75.1%-99.9% Equity 17.1 13.8 10.3 6.6
50.1%-75% Equity 19.5 20.4 19.5 17.2
Table1: Portfolio composition as a function of age.
(Sources: TIAA-CREF Institute Research (2000), and TIAA-CREF
Actuarial Technical (1986))
Following Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996), we show that there exist
some convincing arguments sustaining the common wisdom that agents with
a longer time horizon should take more risk. The next two sections present
the benchmark model where an investor facing unpredictable financial mar-
kets invests at young age a specific amount to finance his consumption in
n years from now. We explain why the optimal portfolio is independent of
n in that case. In section 4, we show that the optimal portfolio risk is in-
creasing in n if the agent can compensate early financial losses by saving
more during her career. We take into account the riskiness of human capital
and the flexibility of labour supply respectively in sections 5 and 6. Sec-
tion 7 is devoted to a short introduction to the effect of predictable returns
(mean-reversion, stochastic volatility and Bayesian learning) on the dynamic
portfolio strategy.
2 The initial building block: Optimal static
portfolios
Let us start the analysis by assuming that the consumer is close to retire and
to liquidate her portfolio. The consumer’s current wealth on her individual
pension account is w0. The consumer’s immediate problem is to determine
the portfolio of financial assets that maximizes the expected utility of her
accumulated pension wealth at the end of the period. Because of the short
time remaining before the liquidation of the portfolio, this decision problem
is essentially static. Assuming a complete set of Arrow-Debreu assets, this
portfolio choice problem is written as
max
c1,...,cS
SX
s=1
psu(cs) s.t.
SX
s=1
Πscs = w0, (1)
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where s = 1, ..., S is an index for the S possible states of nature that could
prevail at the retirement date, ps is the objective probability of state s, Πs
is the price of the Arrow-Debreu security associated to that state, and cs
is the number of Arrow-Debreu securities s that are purchased. Because
cs is also the pension wealth of the agent at the end of the period, u(cs)
is the utility that the retiree extracts from consuming this wealth over her
remaining lifetime. We assume that u is increasing and concave. The degree
of tolerance to risk on retirement wealth is measured by T (c) = −u0(c)/u00(c).
The budget constraint in (1) just states that the accumulated pension wealth
z at the beginning of the period is used to purchase portfolio (c1, ..., cS) of
Arrow-Debreu securities.
Observe that we do not restrict the investment opportunity set in any
way. This means that households are allowed to invest in stocks, bonds, but
also in real estate, portfolio insurance, options and other exotic assets. Our
aim is to describe the unconstrained optimum. There are several reasons why
regulators could want to restrict portfolio choices, for example because of the
implicit portfolio insurance that the state would provide if a financial crash
would bring future (risk-loving) retirees into poverty. Constraining individual
portfolio choices may be good to fight the moral hazard problem associated
with this implicit solidarity mechanism, but it introduces inefficiencies in the
allocation of risk in the economy. The optimal portfolio management when
upper limits to the portfolio risk are imposed is a difficult question that will
not be examined in this paper.1
The first-order condition of program (1) can be written as cs = C(Πs/ps)
where function C satisfies
u0(C(π)) = ξπ, (2)
with ξ denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint.
Observe that the demand for the Arrow-Debreu security s is only a function
of πs = Πs/ps, the state price per unit of probability. Obviously, C is non-
increasing in π : risk-averse investors accept to have a smaller final wealth
level in more expensive states. The riskiness of the optimal portfolio can be
measured by how the riskiness of asset returns — which can be measured by
the variability of πs = Πs/ps — is transferred to riskiness of final wealth. The
absolute value of the derivative of C with respect to π does exactly that.
1For more details on this question, see for example Grossman and Vila (1992).
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Fully differentiating the condition (2) yields
|C 0(π)| = T (C(π))
π
. (3)
This means that more risk-tolerant agents purchase a riskier portfolio. In
the remainder of the paper, we examine how the riskiness of the optimal
portfolio is affected by the age of the consumer.
3 Merton’s result: Age is irrelevant
In this section, we determine the optimal dynamic portfolio strategy of a
younger consumer. This consumer with current pension wealth w0 has n
periods to go before liquidating her personal pension plan. Thus, contrary
to what we assumed in the previous section, she does not consume the value
of the portfolio at the end of the first period. Rather, she will reinvest the
accumulated capital in an asset portfolio for another n− 1 periods. We are
interested in determining how these future investment opportunities affect
the attitude of the young consumer towards the current portfolio risk. To
solve this problem, we use backward induction.
We assume that the investment opportunity set in each period t is not
contingent to the past history. The investment opportunity set at each date
is thus fully characterized by the vector of Arrow-Debreu prices (Π1, ...,ΠS).
Assuming that this vector is independent of past events means that future
asset prices are unpredictable: there is no mean-reversion, no learning and no
stochastic volatility in asset returns. Under this assumption, the only state
variable of the dynamic problem is the accumulated wealth z at the decision
date under scrutiny. Given z at date t, the consumer selects the portfolio to
hold until the next date that maximizes the expected value of his pension
wealth at date t+ 1:
vt(z) = maxc1,...,cS
SX
s=1
psvt+1(cs) s.t.
SX
s=1
Πscs = z, (4)
We first solve this problem for t = n − 1, i.e., when the agent has only
one period to go before retirement. Because vn(c) = u(c) by definition, this
portfolio problem is formally equivalent to the static portfolio problem that
we examined in the previous section. We can thus interpret vn−1(z) as the
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optimal expected utility of final pension wealth conditional to accumulating
pension wealth z one period before retirement age. Using this function, we
can go one date backward to find value function vn−2 , and so on.
To determine the impact of age on the optimal portfolio, we need to
compare the solutions of program (4) for the various dates t from 1 to n.
Observe that the only difference between these different programs comes from
the transformation of the value function from vt to vτ . As explained in the
previous section, an agent with age t should accept more portfolio risk than
an agent with age τ > t if and only if the value function vt exhibits more risk
tolerance than the utility function vτ , or equivalently, if −v0t/v00t ≥ −v0τ/v00τ .
Let us first compare vn−1 to vn ≡ u. Fully differentiating the system of
equations ⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
psu0(cs) = ξΠs
v0n−1(z) = ξPS
s=1Πscs = z
with respect to z yields
Tvn−1(z) = −
v0n−1(z)
v00n−1(z)
=
SX
s=1
ΠsT (cs). (5)
Tvn−1 is the degree of tolerance to portfolio risk of the agent with two periods
to go before retirement. Suppose that the agent has a power utility function
u(c) = c1−γ/(1 − γ), which implies that absolute risk tolerance T (c) = c/γ
is proportional to retirement consumption c. Using the budget constraint,
equation (5) is then rewritten as Tvn−1(z) = T (z). By backward induction,
Tvt(z) = T (z) for all t = 1, ..., n : the degrees of risk-tolerance of the value
functions and of the utility function are identical. This means that the at-
titude towards portfolio risk is independent of age. Age, or the investment
time-horizon, is irrelevant for determining the optimal structure of the pen-
sion portfolio. Here, myopia is optimal in the sense that the best investment
strategy is obtained by assuming in each period that this is the last period
before retirement. This result has been independently discovered by Mossin
(1968), Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969).
Proposition 1 Consider the asset allocation problem with commited and de-
fined contributions. Assume constant relative risk aversion and unpredictable
asset returns. In such a situation, the optimal portfolio structure is indepen-
dent of age.
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Mossin (1968) observed that power utility functions are the only functions
with such a nice property. This is easily seen from property (5) by using
Jensen’s inequality when T is either concave or convex, or when T (0) 6= 0, as
explained in Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002). However, calibrating the model
shows that the non-proportionality of the absolute risk tolerance has only a
marginal effect on the optimal portfolio of young investors.
This model relies on the assumption of frictionless financial markets. In
particular, we assumed above the absence of any transaction cost and bid-ask
spread. This is obviously unrealistic. Taking into account of these frictions
implies that it may be optimal not to rebalance the portfolio in case of limited
capital gains or losses. But their effect on the optimal portfolio at young age
is ambiguous. Frictions on the housing market also have an ambiguous effect
of the age structure of optimal portfolios.
4 Human capital and flexible contributions
to the pension plan
The previous dynamic portfolio problem isolated the problem of financing
consumption after retirement from the other sources of needs, incomes and
risks faced by the consumer in her entire lifetime. In this section, we introduce
intermediary consumption and labour incomes in the model. Suppose that
the agent has n consumption dates t = 1, ..., n to go before retirement. Her
flow of labour incomes is denoted (y1, ..., yn) and is assumed to be risk-free
at this stage of the analysis. Let β denote the psychological discount factor
of the agent, and r is the riskfree rate.
Consider first a pension plan in which the agent must commit herself on
the flow of her contributions (q1, q2, ..., qn) until retirement. This is equivalent
to funding the plan with a single lump-sum contribution
w0 =
nX
t=1
qt
(1 + r)t
at date t = 1. Given that initial pension wealth w0, the problem of the
optimal dynamic portfolio management is not different to the one that we
examined in the previous section. In particular, if relative risk aversion is
constant, myopia is optimal: if two agents have the same current pension
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wealth w0, they should hold the same portfolio even if they don’t have the
same age. The optimal portfolio risk is proportional to T (w0).
Consider alternatively a pension plan with fully flexible contributions
over time. At each date t before retirement, the agent decides how much
to contribute to the plan and how to invest the pension wealth on financial
markets. This dynamic consumption-portfolio problem is written as
ht(z) = maxq,c1,...,cS
u(yt − q) + β
SX
s=1
psht+1(cs) s.t.
SX
s=1
Πscs = z + q. (6)
From current labour income yt at date t, the agent decides to save q and
to consume the remaining yt − q at that date. Saving q is added to the
past accumulated wealth z, and everything is optimally invested on financial
markets. As before, we first solve this problem for t = n − 1, using the
fact that hn ≡ u. Solving this problem yields the optimal saving strategy
s0 and the optimal portfolio strategy (c1, ..., cS) for that date. It also yields
the maximum discounted expected utility hn−1 that is used to solve the
consumption-portfolio problem for date n− 2.
Taking into account the equivalence of programs (4) and (6), we obtain
that
Thn−1(z) = T (c0) +
SX
s=1
ΠsT (cs), (7)
where c0 = yn−1 − q is optimal consumption. Assuming again that relative
risk aversion is constant and using the budget constraint, this implies that
Thn−1(z) = T (z + (1 + r)
−1yn),
where by definition (1 + r)−1 =
P
Πs. By backward induction, we obtain
that
Tht(z) = T (z + Yt) where Yt =
nX
τ=t+1
yτ
(1 + r)τ−t
is the NPV of future labour income, i.e., the human capital at date t. Because
Yt is decreasing in t, the degree of risk tolerance of the agent goes down
when she grows older. Thus, agents with flexible contribution plans should
rebalance their portfolio in favor of the risk-free asset when they are close to
retire. Notice also that, because the agent starts initially with zero pension
wealth z = 0, the optimal portfolio risk at young age with this fully flexible
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pension plan is proportional to Th0(0) = T (Y0). Thus, when we allow for
flexible contributions, the portfolio risk is proportional to T (Y0) whereas it is
proportional to T (w0) = (w0/Y0)T (Y0) in the rigid case. Because the NPV
w0 of the flow of contributions in the rigid plan must be smaller than the
NPV Y0 of the flow of labour incomes, we proved the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose constant relative risk aversion. When the contri-
butions to the pension plan are predetermined, the optimal portfolio risk is
independent of age, whereas it is decreasing with age when contributions are
flexible. Moreover, the optimal portfolio riskiness at young age is increased
by a factor Y0/w0 if we allow for the contributions to the pension plan to be
flexible compared to the rigid case, where w0 is the net present value of the
contributions in the rigid plan, and Y0 is the human capital of the agent.
A crude estimate of Y0/w0 is around 10, which means that the flexible
plan should invest 10 times more in risky assets than if the plan has a pre-
established and rigid flow of contributions. As explained in Gollier (2002),
the intuition for such a powerful effect is the ability of the flexible plan to
”time-diversify” shocks on pension wealth by splitting it into small shocks
on consumption over the remaining lifetime. Of course, this effect goes down
as the time-horizon shortens, which yields a strong negative age effect on the
optimal portfolio risk.
5 Uncertain human capital
Up to now, we assumed that the only source of uncertainty comes from the
households’ financial investments. For the sake of realism, we need to take
into account the fact that the flow of labour incomes is also uncertain: young
workers can face much uncertainty about the value of their human capital.
In the same vein, future promotions and unemployment spells are uncer-
tain. The uncertainty affecting human capital is expected to affect both the
optimal wealth accumulation and the optimal structure of the pension port-
folio. It is well-known since Leland (1968) and Dre`ze and Modigliani (1972)
that prudent consumers will save more when their future incomes become
riskier in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Gollier and Pratt
(1996) showed that risk-vulnerable consumers are more averse to portfolio
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risk when they bear an independent risk on their human capital. The con-
cepts of prudence and risk vulnerability are related respectively to the third
and fourth derivatives of the utility function. Consumers with constant rela-
tive risk aversion are both prudent and risk-vulnerable. Thus, under CRRA,
the uncorrelated uncertainty affecting human capital raises the accumulation
of financial wealth and it reduces the share of this wealth invested in risky
assets.
How does the uncertainty of human capital affect the relationship between
age and the optimal portfolio structure? Because younger households face
more uncertainty on their human capital, they should select a safer portfolio.
This argument is particularly relevant when households are likely to face a
liquidity constraint. The households’ unability to borrow in order to finance
consumption in periods of low labour incomes magnifies the riskiness of hu-
man capital. To sum up, age horizon has two contradictory effects on the
optimal portfolio. As stated in Proposition 2, younger households can better
diversify their portfolio risk, which implies that they should take more port-
folio risk. On the contrary, younger agents face more uncertainty on their
human capital, which implies that they should select a safer portfolio. Which
of these two effects dominates the other depends upon the intensity of the
risk on human capital.
Including an uninsurable background risk together with a liquidity con-
straint to the dynamic consumption-portfolio problem makes it unsolvable
analytically. In the following calibration exercise, we consider an agent with
constant relative risk aversion γ = 10. Both the riskfree rate and the rate
of pure preference for the present are assumed to be zero. There is only
one risky asset which has an excess return of 7% per year and a standard
deviation of 12%. We assume that the worker has 15 years to live when he
retires. At the exogenous retirement age, the pension wealth is invested in
the risk-free asset to finance consumption over the remaining lifetime. Before
retirement, the agent faces an unemployment risk which takes the following
form: when he is employed, his yearly labour income is normalized to unity,
whereas unemployment benefits equal only 50% of the labour income. When
employed in year t, the agent faces the risk to become unemployed in year
t+ 1. This happens with probability 5%. On the contrary, if unemployed in
year t, the agent finds a new job in year t+1 with probability 0.5. In Figure
1, we draw the optimal investment in the risky asset as a function of financial
wealth z, for different time horizons when the agent is employed.
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Figure 1: The optimal investment in stock (in the employment state) as a
function of current financial wealth, for different time horizons.
When the agent has accumulated a large pension wealth, the riskiness
of the optimal portfolio is decreasing with age, as stated in Proposition 2.
But when financial reserves are small, the riskiness of the optimal portfolio
is increasing with age. Because of the inability of young households to time-
diversify their unemployment risk, a safer portfolio is optimal. When they
grow older, this risk on human capital becomes smaller, and they should
rebalance their portfolio in favor of the risky asset, until the limited ability
of old consumers to time-diversify their portfolio risk becomes the dominant
factor. In this calibration, the effect of age on the demand for the risky asset
is ceteris paribus first increasing, and then decreasing.
6 Flexible labour supply
Another unpleasant aspect of the benchmark dynamic model presented in
section 4 comes from the assumption that households have no control of
their labour supply. In particular, workers cannot compensate their financial
losses on the pension wealth by working more. Bodie, Merton and Samuelson
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(1992) examined the effect of a flexible labour supply on the optimal dynamic
portfolio strategy. We can extend the benchmark model (6) to endogeneize
labour decision. Suppose that the agent has one unit of time per period to
allocate between leisure L and labour 1 − L. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that the wage per unit of working time equals y, which is constant
over time. Let bu(c, L) denote the felicity of the agent who consumes a share
L of leisure and who consumes c = y(1 − L) − q of the consumption good,
where q denotes savings. As usual, we assume that bu is concave in (c, L).
The decision problem of the household with accumulated wealth z at date t
can then be written as
ht(z) = max
L,q,c1,...,cS
bu(y(1−L)−q, L)+β SX
s=1
psht+1(cs) s.t.
SX
s=1
Πscs = z+q.
(8)
Notice that we assume here that there is full flexibility in the sense that
workers can increase or reduce their working time at any time, and at their
best convenience. In particular, the agent is here assumed to fully control
his/her age of retirement. It is noteworthy that the above problem is strictly
equivalent to problem (6) where function u would be defined as follows:
u(c) = max
L
bu(c− yL,L). (9)
It is easy to check that the absolute risk aversion of the indirect utility
function u equals
−u
00(c)
u0(c)
= −
bu11(c− yL∗, L∗)bu1(c− yL∗, L∗) + [y
bu11(c− yL∗, L∗)− bu12(c− yL∗, L∗)]2
y2bu11(c− yL∗, L∗)− 2ybu12(c− yL∗, L∗) + bu22(c− yL∗, L∗) .
(10)
Observe that the second term of the right-hand side of the above equal-
ity is negative because of the concavity of bu. Observe also that −bu11(c −
yL∗, L∗)/bu1(c − yL∗, L∗) is the absolute of risk aversion of a worker who
rigidly supplies labour L∗. These observations yield the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3 Consider two agents with the same utility function bu on con-
sumption and leisure. Let L∗ denote the optimal leisure given wage y and
consumption c. The agent who can adapt his labour supply to changes in in-
comes is locally less risk-averse than the agent who has a rigid labour supply
12
L∗:
−u
00(c)
u0(c)
≤ −
bu11(c− yL∗, L∗)bu1(c− yL∗, L∗) .
Notice that the nature of the dynamic portfolio problem is not trans-
formed by this form of labour flexibility. Labour flexibility just reduces the
concavity of the utility function u in program (6). In particular, if the in-
direct utility function u exhibits constant relative risk aversion, the optimal
portfolio structure is independent of age when contributions to the pension
plan are pre-established. The only effect of the flexible labour market is to
raise the share of the households’ wealth invested in stocks, at all ages.
The message will not be the same if we suppose alternatively that the
flexibility of labour supply is limited to the decision on the age of (partial)
retirement. In that case, only the risk aversion (−u00/u0) at old age is reduced,
whereas risk aversion (−bu11/bu1) when retirement is not allowed remains large.
This implies that the degree of risk aversion of the value function is reduced
for older households, yielding a riskier optimal portfolio.
7 Predictable asset returns
The absence of any predictability in asset returns has long been considered
as a dogma in the theory of finance. Several empirical findings have reversed
this idea over the last two decades. For example, Barberis (2000) estimates
significant mean-reversion in U.S. stock returns: a high return of the risky
portfolio in period t implies a lower expected portfolio return period t + 1.
Because mean-reversion implies that stocks are safer in the long run, the
intuition suggests that a long horizon agent should have a positive ”hedging
demand” for risk in the initial stage of the game. Kim and Omberg (1996)
and Kogan and Uppal (2000) showed that this is indeed the case if constant
relative risk aversion is larger than unity. Campbell and Viceira (1999)
and Barberis (2000) have shown that the hedging demand for stocks is sur-
prisingly large. For an agent with a relative risk aversion equaling 10 and a
ten-year time horizon, the optimal investment in stocks is about 40% of cur-
rent wealth without predictability. It goes up to 100% when mean-reversion
is taken into account.
Predictability also arises from random time-varying volatility of stock
returns. There is ample evidence that large negative returns tend to be asso-
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ciated with increases in volatility over long periods of time (see for example
Ghysels, Harvey and Renault (1996)). Chacko and Viceira (2000) show that
long-term investors with a constant relative risk aversion larger than unity
should reduce their demand for stocks in that environment.
Predictability is an important element to take into account to discuss the
age profile of optimal portfolios. For investors who are close to retire, the
existence of predictable future returns is irrelevant for their portfolio decision,
since they will be out of the market when those changes will occur. On the
contrary, households with a longer time horizon should take into account
those future changes in their current choices. For example, we can infer from
Barberis (2000) that the existence of mean-reversion in U.S. stocks returns
multiplies the demand for stocks from investors with a ten-year time-horizon
by a factor larger than 2 when compared to the stock demand from investors
with only one year to go before retirement.
The predictability of asset returns is linked to changes in the investment
opportunity set over time. Asset returns are somewhat predictable if these
stochastic changes are correlated with an observable variable. In the cases of
mean-reversion and stochastic volatility, this observable variable is the vector
of past returns. More generally, when this observable variable is correlated
to past returns, investors should insure against undesirable future changes
in the investment opportunity set by investing more in assets which perform
well when the opportunity set deteriorates. This is the hedging demand
for stocks. For example, in the case of mean-reversion of stock returns, the
fact that stock returns are high when the investment opportunity set dete-
riorates induces a positive hedging demand for stocks. On the contrary, in
the case of stochastic volatility, the investment opportunity set is improved
(stocks become less risky) when returns are high. This implies a negative
hedging demand for stocks. This effect is small compared to the effect of
mean-reversion, which implies that younger households should invest more
in stocks.
In our benchmark model (4), the investment opportunity set at date t
is characterized by the vector (Π1, ...,ΠS) of the prices of the Arrow-Debreu
securities. Because we assumed this vector to be stable over time, our model
had no predictability in asset returns. Suppose alternatively that the vector
of state prices at the beginning of the last period before retirement depends
upon the state of nature sn−1 that prevailed one period earlier. In the ab-
sence of intermediary consumption, the portfolio problem at that date can
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be written as
vn−1(z; sn−1) = maxc1,...,cS
SX
s=1
psu(cs) s.t.
SX
s=1
Πs(sn−1)cs = z. (11)
The value function vn−1 has now a second state variable, which is past history
I. When u exhibits constant relative risk aversion γ, it is easy to check that
vn−1(z; sn−1) = Kn−1(sn−1)
z1−γ
1− γ with Kn−1(sn−1) =
⎛
⎝
SX
s=1
ps
Ã
Πs(sn−1)
ps
!γ−1
γ
⎞
⎠
γ
.
(12)
Any change in history that yields a mean-preserving spread in the distribu-
tion of Π/p makes the agent better off, i.e., raises vn−1. Observe that this
means that such a change in the investment opportunity set reduces Kn−1 if
relative risk aversion is larger than unity. When γ is less than one, a MPS in
Π/p raisesKn−1. Gollier (2004) shows that an increase in the equity premium
or a reduction in the volatility of equity returns yield such a mean-preserving
spread in state prices.
We are interested in determining the effect of predictability on the optimal
portfolio two periods before retirement. The optimal demand for the AD
security associated to state s at date t = n−2 is determined by the marginal
value of wealth in that state, which is equal to
∂vn−1
∂z
(cs; s) = Kn−1(s)c−γs = ξn−2
Πs
ps
. (13)
Suppose that the return of equity is low in state s, which means that Πs/ps
is large. First-order condition (13) implies that the demand cs for that AD
security is negatively affected by this high price (negative substitution ef-
fect). But suppose that this expensive state in period n−2 is associated to a
mean-preserving spread in state prices in period n, as is the case with mean-
reversion. When γ is larger than unity, we know from (12) that it yields a
reduction in Kn−1. This reduction yields a negative hedging demand for that
AD security, thereby reinforcing the substitution effect. Symmetrically, the
demand for AD securities associated to cheap states has a positive substi-
tution effect, and a positive reinforcing hedging effect. Ex-ante, the optimal
portfolio in period n−2 is made riskier due to the presence of mean-reversion.
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Proposition 4 Consider the dynamic investment problem with constant rel-
ative risk aversion larger than unity and with mean-reversion in equity re-
turns. In such a situation, younger households should purchase riskier port-
folios.
Observe however that this recommendation is reversed for households
with a constant relative risk aversion smaller than unity. This is because
mean-preserving spreads in Π/p raise the marginal value of wealth in spite
of the fact that these changes are desirable. Gollier (2004) generalizes this
result to utility functions without constant relative risk aversion.
As observed by Chacko and Viceira (2000), the fact that a drop in stock
returns is generally followed by an increase in stock return volatility (i.e., a
mean-preserving contraction in state prices Π/p) generates an effect on dy-
namic portfolio management which is exactly opposite to the one presented
in Proposition 4. Contrary to mean-reversion where bad news on instanta-
neous returns is good news for the future investment opportunity set, sto-
chastic volatility means that bad news on instantaneous returns is bad news
for the future. Thus, stochastic volatility combined with a constant relative
risk aversion larger than unity implies that younger investors should select
safer portfolios.
In all these models, we assumed that investors know the distribution of
stocks returns. Various authors since Detemple (1986) and Gennotte (1986)
have argued that young investors may face considerable uncertainty about it.
As investors grow older, they observe stock returns, and they update their
beliefs by using Bayes’ rule. How does this parameter uncertainty affect the
optimal dynamic portfolio strategy? To answer this question, notice that
good news on instantaneous returns are also good news for the future invest-
ment opportunity set, since Bayesian investors will update their beliefs in a
more optimistic way after observing a large instantaneous return. Thus, as
for stochastic volatility, we are in a situation opposite to the one presented in
Proposition 4. As shown in Gollier (2004) who provides a complete typology
of predictability models, Bayesian learning on an uncertain equity premium
implies that younger investors should select safer portfolios when absolute
prudence −u000/u00 is smaller than twice the absolute risk aversion. Under
constant relative risk aversion, this is equivalent to γ being larger than unity.
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8 Conclusion
Should younger households invest more in risky assets? To answer this ques-
tion, we first considered a simple model where households who save exclu-
sively for their retirement do not control their contribution to their pension
plan. In this benchmark model, we also assumed that assets returns are un-
predictable, and that households have no flexibility in their labour supply.
Following the seminal contributions of Mossin (1968), Merton (1969) and
Samuelson (1969), we showed that investors with a constant relative risk
aversion should select a portfolio structure which is independent of their age.
From this benchmark result, we provided two arguments in favor of a
negative effect of age on the portfolio riskiness. The most convincing one re-
laxes the constraint that investors cannot adapt their contributions to their
individual pension plan to shocks on their pension wealth. In reality, young
households anticipate that they will save more during their career if their
pension plans do not perform well, and that they will save less if their early
portfolio return is large. This time diversification of the risk on pension wealth
provides a strong incentive to invest more aggressively on the stocks market
at young age. The second argument in favor of this recommendation comes
from the observation that there is some mean-reversion in stocks returns.
This implies that young investors face a long-term portfolio risk that is rela-
tively smaller than in the unpredictable case. We showed that young investors
with a relative risk aversion larger than unity should take into account this
observation by investing more in stocks. These two effects are large. The first
tends to multiply the demand for stocks from young investors by a factor 10,
whereas mean-reversion tends to multiply it by a factor 2.
However, there also exist various arguments going in the opposite direc-
tion. First, one should take into account of the fact that the return of human
capital is highly uncertain for most young households. If they cannot time-
diversify this risk because of liquidity constraints for example, these young
households should select a safer portfolio. The fact that younger investors
face some uncertainty on the true distribution of the equity premium pro-
vides another argument in favor of their selection of a safer portfolio. Finally,
the fact that the volatility of equity returns is increased after a crash also
tends to reduce the optimal risk exposure of long-term investors.
The fact that households can react to shocks on their pension wealth by
adapting their labour supply has no clear effect on the age profile of optimal
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portfolios. If the flexibility of labour supply is the same at all ages, the only
effect of this flexibility is to raise the demand for stocks at all age. On the
contrary, if the labour flexibility is limited to the decision on the retirement
age, then this provides an incentive for older workers to invest more in risky
assets.
The bottom line of the analysis is that there is no universal answer to the
question of whether younger households should be less risk-averse. Its answer
depends upon individual characteristics such as for example the riskiness of
the household’s human capital, the intensity of potential liquidity constraints
faced by it, the degree of flexibility of the household’s labour supply, or the
quality of the household’s knowledge of the functioning of financial markets.
Calibration exercises seem to favor a share of wealth invested in stocks that
is decreasing with age.
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